Introduction
Fatal Ties: Armenians, Kurds and Turks

The year 2015 in April. Dislocated and marginalized lies what had been the Old City of Van, as a sea of debris at the feet of the castle in the abandoned outskirts of the New City. With the exception of Muslim sites of worship such as the Ulu Cami and Kizil Minareli Cami, the old center of the city formerly known as Şahestan has been left to decay and dissolve in the self-oblivious web of time. The city, which had been at the nexus of the political struggle of Ottoman Armenians a century ago and formed, in the eyes of some, the imaginary capital of a nascent “Western Armenia”, now lies disfigured along the swampy coastline of Lake Van. Emptied of its former Armenian populations during what was known to contemporary observers as a “crime against humanity”, and to posterity as the first genocide of the 20th century, the city today harbors a majority Kurdish population, while being located in the southeastern part of Turkey.

In 1928, thirteen years after the genocide which was met in Van with fierce resistance by its Armenian residents, the Soviet-Armenian writer Gurgen Mahari, in his less-known biographic work Mankutyun (“Childhood”, 1928), embarks on an imaginary travel to what has become, in his words, a merradz kaghat, a “perished city” or literally, a “deceased city”. “My uncle resurfaces from within the blue veil of history, standing on the ruins of the perished city”,1 writes Mahari in a cryptic sequence at the end of the novel. What follows is the fictitious dialogue with his deceased family members who are eternally chained to the ruins of the perished city. Mahari’s monologue echoes the words of the fictitious narrator in Chris Marker’s experimental film Sans Soleil: “Who said that time heals all wounds?” he asks, continuing:

it would be better to say that time heals everything – except wounds. With time, the hurt of separation loses its real limits. With time, the desired body will soon disappear, and if the desiring body has already ceased to exist for the other, then what remains is a wound, disembodied.2

Few words could describe the sea of debris at the feet of the Van Castle better than “disembodied wound”. And indeed, the stones scattered around
what had been Old Van did outlast the desiring body of Mahari, who died in Yerevan in 1969, sharing the fate of tens of thousands of Van’s former Ottoman Armenian residents forced into an exile from which they would not return. Simultaneously, speaking with the words of famous genocide scholar Ronald Grigor Suny, as “Western Armenia bleeds into Northern Kurdistan”, the “disembodied wound” of a century ago inflames again, producing a cicatized landscape of violence, scarred with new territorial contestations that continue to shake the region until this day. Spatially rooted in the shatter zone of the post-Ottoman and post-Soviet space, the greater Van region in eastern Turkey emerges, to those who visit it, as an embattled dreamland where competing imaginaries of homeland stretch back continuously from the Armenian Genocide (1915) of the past to the Kurdish conflict (1984–today) of the present.

While most contemporary literature investigates the Armenian Question of the past and the Kurdish question of the present as two events that merely coincided in the same space, this work instead sets out to explore their interdependence. Understanding Kurds and Armenians as two people fatally tied together across a temporal and spatial scale, it sets out to identify opposing historical trajectories. On the one hand, a line of continuity can be identified, revolving around the notion of shared victimhood at the hand of the Turkish state: “They had them [the Armenians] for breakfast and us for lunch”, goes a famous saying among the Kurdish residents of the region. The underlying argument is based on the idea that, after the Armenian Genocide, it was the Kurds who were (in their eyes) subjected to similar violence by the Turkish state.

And indeed, civil Kurdish populations died in tens of thousands when the Turkish state waged its costly military campaigns against what they saw as illegitimate cells of resistance – from violent suppression of the Dersim rebellion in 1937 to the shelling of Kurdish-populated cities like Cizre and Yüksekova in 2015. In the case of the latter, the parallels become even more apparent – in September 2015, a video emerged showing Turkish soldiers addressing the resisting Kurdish population with, “You are all Armenians” (hepiniz Ermenisiniz). The critical-minded Cumhuriyet newspaper columnist Aydin Erdoğan sees in the violence of today the blueprint of the Armenian Genocide: both Armenians and Kurds were regarded as harmful elements to the survival of the Turkish nation, accused of treason and collaboration with external enemies. Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, even goes one step further, arguably overstretching the analogy: while the Armenians were subjected to genocide only once, Kurds were “always held at the brink of cultural genocide” (kültürel soykırımın eşiğinde).

On the other hand, an opposing historical trajectory drives a wedge between Kurds and Armenians, and complicates the story of shared victimhood: while Kurds had inhabited the region alongside Syriacs and Armenians in the pre-1915 period, it was only after the genocidal policies of World War I that a remaining Kurdish population emerged as
a crushing majority. Ironically, the very policies of the Young Turks to eliminate Armenians concentrated the remaining Kurdish population as a critical majority and, in this sense, unintentionally elicited the demand for incorporation of the region into an imagined Northern Kurdistan. In simpler terms, there would be no prospect and vision of a Northern Kurdistan in Kars and Van without the genocide. Even more, Kurds became partners in crime with the Young Turks in 1915. Whether agitated by local religious leaders who promised paradise to those who kill more than seven Armenians, or entirely mundane motives such as economic gain, historian Fırat Aydinkaya’s words seem to ring true: “Without Kurdish complicity (ıştirak) Armenians would have been removed from Turkey but not from the Kurdish periphery”.7

Both examples show illustratively the fatal ties that continue to link together the residing and those expelled a century ago. For the current residents — a crushing majority of Kurdish-speaking Muslims alongside Alevis and Turks — it is an estranging place of origin, a scarred geography cluttered with the ruins of those expelled (and murdered) more than a century ago. For those whose descendants were expelled to “Caucasian Armenia” — Armenians, Yezidis and Syriacs — it remains an illusionary place, a realm of nostalgia and refuge from present-day hardship. Yet, imaginaries of a homeland lost (Armenians), found (Turks) and denied (Kurds) transcend the private realm of personal nostalgia, and inform powerful political narratives that advance and contest territorial claims. As I will show in this book, the mass atrocities perpetrated against the non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 are utilized in different national contexts today to sustain, through mutually exclusive interpretations of the past, the national collectives of Turks, Armenians and Kurds, and to inform antagonistic territorial imaginaries: Eastern Turkey – Western Armenia – Northern Kurdistan.

Over the last few decades, the way state and society negotiate these competing interpretations of the past — that is, the politics of memory — has elicited widespread interest among sociologists, political scientists, historians, anthropologists and philologists. Maurice Halbwachs, who is regarded by many as the “father of memory studies”, touched upon the issue of public memorialization of historical events as early as the late 1920s and 1930s in works like Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (1939) and La mémoire collective (1925).8 Towards the end of the 20th century, an increasing amount of academic research started to critically engage with the nation-state more vocally, and questioned the purported objectivity of “official histories”. Path-breaking works such as Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) and Pierre Nora’s Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past (1998) paved the way for a critical engagement with artifacts of public memory and the spatial rooting of collective memory.9 In his work, Anderson identifies cenotaphs and tombs of unknown soldiers as “arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism”, and
explores their role in underpinning a particularly “national” interpretation of the past.10

During the same period, questions around the role of memory, both during and after World War II, were studied in a more sophisticated manner in further research, as reflected in James E. Young’s article *The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany Today* (1992) and George L. Mosse’s monograph *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (1990). The latter deals with the myth of martyrdom and, in a more general sense, public memorialization of wartime experiences as a mobilizing force during conflict.11 Engagement with memory as a resource of different social and political actors – that is, exploring the “politics of memory” – elicited new interest among scholars. The resulting explorations into the crafting, fabrication and suppression of narratives of the past transcended both academic disciplines and communities.

Given the peculiar historical context of the Holocaust and its aftermath, it is hardly surprising to see that critical engagement with the genocidal legacy of Nazi Germany would propel cutting-edge scholarship at the intersection of memory and violence. Unlike Anglo-American scholarship, German scholarship juxtaposes *politics of memory* with a different notion, *geschichtspolitik*, which literally translates as “politics of history”. Likewise different from the more state-centered approach reflected in the French terms *politique publique de l’histoire* or *politique publique de la mémoire*, the notion of *geschichtspolitik* is characterized by a more integrative approach that recognizes the role of both state and non-state actors in shaping public memory.12 In addition to social scientists, prominent scholars from the humanities also joined the debate, such as historian Reinhart Koselleck, who declared *geschichtspolitik* a “suspicious word” (*verdächtige vokabel*), as it implied galvanizing a multitude of historical experiences into the singular body of a national collective of memory:13

"History cannot be politicized. Whoever deems himself capable of doing so has already fallen victim to his own ideology."14

A further dimension of politics of memory rather peculiar to German literature can be found in works dealing with *vergangenheitspolitik* (“politics concerning the past”). *Vergangenheitspolitik* is widely employed as a more normative term, and thus largely overlaps with research conducted in the field of transitional justice.15 Ultimately, through translation of selected works written by leading scholars from Germany, such as Aleida and Jan Assmann, the notion of “politics of history” entered both the Polish (*polityka historyczna*) and Russian (*istoricheskaya politika*) scholarly discourse.16

With regard to the Turkish case, arguably one of the earliest references to politics of memory in the republican period (1923–now) can be found in the introductory chapter of Doğan Avcıoğlu’s 1979 historical work *Türklerin Tarihi* (“The History of the Turks”). In his work, which is
informed by a blend of Kemalist national and Marxist socialist ideas, he argues that “one of the main endeavors of Atatürk, while seeking to create a nation was to give his nation a history”.17 In this regard, Avcıoğlu borrows from the early writings of Friedrich Engels the notion of “nations without history” (geschichtslose völker), and argues that only through the construction of a national history “embedded in the evolutionary history of human civilization” could Turkey overcome her backwardness and join the rank of Western nations.18 Avcıoğlu sees in the Kemalist project, to which he professes his outright sympathy throughout his work, an endeavor to challenge a deeply rooted tradition in Western historiography of constructing the Turkish people as the antipode of Western civilization, by characterizing them as an Asian (non-European) and Muslim (non-Christian) people. Simultaneously, he advocates a critical approach to history, rooted in a sound analysis of socio-economic factors, and a profound skepticism towards mystified accounts of Ottoman conquest and bygone glory:

These histories [early Ottoman historiography] exclude not only the Turks but all people. Instead of people there are sultans. What was written was not history, but a eulogy [to the rulers].19

What is remarkable in this context is that, unlike other national writers in late 1970s Turkey, Avcıoğlu did not employ an essentialist notion of the Turkish nation as the nation of the Turks. Instead, he understands the Republic of Turkey not in continuity with historical Turkic empires, but as a “first Turkish state”, populated by people who can claim their ancestry to both “the conquerors [e.g. Seljuk Turks] and the conquered [e.g. Christian populations of Anatolia]” alike.20 Yet it was only due to the sociologist and geographer İlhan Tekeli and his work Tarih Yazımı Üzerine Düşünümek (“Thinking about History Writing”, 1998) that the politics of memory has been explored in Turkey as a sociological phenomenon.21 Particularly from the 2000s onwards, a new wave of critical-minded scholars, such as Salih Özbaran, Ahmet Özcan, Oktay Özel and Esra Özyürek, have engaged not only critically with the Turkish nation-state, but have simultaneously questioned its foundational narrative, that is, “National Turkish History”.22 More recent works in Turkey that follow a critical-constructivist approach to the nation-state are Uğur Ümit Üngör’s Modern Türkiye’nin İncası (“The Construction of Modern Turkey”, 2016) and Büşra Ersanlı’s İktidar ve Tarih – Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu 1929–1937 (“Rulership and History – The Formation of ‘Official History’ in Turkey 1929–1937”, 2015).

Regarding the Armenian case, literature specifically dealing with politics of memory is relatively scarce. Nora C. Dudwick’s dissertation on Memory, identity and politics in Armenia (1994) constitutes an exception to this rule, exploring the relationship between the national past, collective memory, and political practice based on 22 months of ethnographic
fieldwork in Armenia between September 1987 and June 1991. This exceptional study is complemented by other works by Levon Abrahamyan, Edmund Herzig, Marina Kurkchiyan, Harutyun Marutyan and Ronald G. Suny. Marutyan, particularly, contributed to our understanding of memory and its evolution in post-socialist Armenia through works such as *Hishoghutyan dern Azgayin Ynkutyun Karutsatukum: Tesakan Hartsadrumner* (“The Role of Memory in the Construction of National Identity: Theoretical Considerations”, 2006) and *The Memory of Genocide and the Karabagh Movement* (2011). Furthermore, Kim Ghalachyan’s pictorial work *Purki Hushardzanner* (“Memorials of Glory”, 1986) provides an illustrative insight into war memorials and national cemeteries in Soviet Armenia. The study of monuments and memorials is further complemented by Hranush Kharatyan-Araqelyan’s article, *On some Features of Armenian-Turkish Joint Memories of the Past* (2011), which – contrary to what its title suggests – provides mainly an overview of how memory on the genocide is inscribed in the landscape of present-day Armenia through public and private memorial sites.25

However, two-fold comparative approaches on Armenian and Turkish politics of memory are relatively scarce. Thomas De Waal’s “Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide” (2015) constitutes a rare monograph on the subject, approaching the issue of conflicting memories from a journalist’s perspective.26 De Waal’s work is complemented by a few other articles that touch upon politics of memory within the narrower framework of international relations and stalled Armenian-Turkish reconciliation efforts.27 In the absence of a sovereign Kurdish nation-state, there is very little research focusing on the politics of memory of Kurdish organizations. A rare example of research dealing explicitly with state-led politics of memory is Sherko Kirmanj’s article *Kurdish History Textbooks: Building a Nation-State within a Nation-State* (2014) – albeit not dealing with the Kurdish populations of Turkey, but the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq.28 Newly emerging research, such as the works of Aras Ramazan (2014) and Hisyar Özsoy (2010) do explore the topic of Kurdish politics of memory in Turkey, yet at least partially portray it as a passive response to Turkish state violence, rather than an active process of forging a national narrative with its own ideological thrust.29 Thus, in spite of an increasing interest in the topic of memory and memory politics among scholars working at the nexus of the Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish community, current academic literature lacks any comprehensive study that explores, in comparative perspective, competing Turkish, Armenian and Kurdish politics of memory.30

In addition to this, important theoretical questions remain. Over the last decades, leading scholars in the vibrant field of critical memory studies such as Paul Connerton, Cathy Carut, Marianne Hirsch, Jan-Werner Müller and Jeffrey K. Ollick have substantially enriched our theoretical understanding of memory and its politicization – on the relationship
between memory and the body, collective memory and collectives of memory, inter-generational transmission and memory, violence and traumatic memory, as well as memory and amnesia. In spite of this, the intertwined processes that characterize the field of contestation between top-down politics of memory and bottom-up counter memory are still in need of further elucidation. There is a wide consensus in memory studies that politics of memory do substantially shape “collective memory” – that is, the multitude of collectives sustained by shared imaginaries of the past. Yet, we continue to lack a more systematic understanding regarding the underlying mechanisms at work. For instance, there are few available insights from field work that allow us to understand to what extent homogenizing national politics of memory actually succeed or fail in establishing their narratives in fiercely contested geographies.

Drawing from my extensive empirical material compiled over five years in both Turkey and Armenia, this work sets out to disentangle these processes. It seeks to unveil how top-down efforts by state and state-like actors to establish their monopoly on the past can be challenged both, on a horizontal level, by competing regimes of memory and, on a vertical level, in bottom-up direction from within the local space. In this sense, this book wants to be read as an investigation into the limits of memory politics and its goal of forging a unitary and hegemonic narration on the past.

My book is divided into five thematic chapters. It offers a novel perspective and analytical framework for the study of collective memory in a threefold contested geography. Chapters 1 and 2 explore collective violence and forced population displacement as the essential precondition in the formation of demographically homogeneous nation-states. They do so by reconstructing the intertwined historical pathways of the Armenian, Turkish and Kurdish national movements, highlighting aspects of cooperation and conflict. Chapter 3 de-masks Armenian, Turkish and Kurdish “national history” as mirrored images of one another and reveals that, while “national histories” are far from being self-evident and uncontested, states and state-like organizations are compelled to employ vast resources to reproduce their interpretation. Chapters 4 and 5 introduce the extended greater Van region as an exemplary, trilaterally embattled geography located at the very nexus of Turkish, Armenian and Kurdish national imaginaries, and argue that factors ingrained in space, such as story-telling, moveable and immovable artifacts, rituals and linguistic landscapes, favor the emergence of counter-narratives. The book concludes with a discussion of memory as a multi-collective phenomenon capable of bridging memory in the Van Lake area across the divide of the currently residing and the expelled.

The book commences with “Saving the Empire, Killing Its Subjects” (Chapter 1), which suggests the reading of collective violence and forced population displacement as essential prerequisites in the formation of demographically homogeneous nation-states. While populated by a heterogeneous
mix of both Muslim (Arabs, Kurds, Turks, etc.) and non-Muslim populations (Armenians, Syriacs, Yezidis, etc.) until the early 20th century, policies of systematic persecution and, ultimately, genocide against the empire’s Armenian and Syriac populations turned the region into an almost exclusively Muslim-populated geography. Based on a thorough reading of archive material as well as secondary sources, this chapter seeks to capture the complex interaction of different motives, ranging from questions of German-Ottoman war interests and personal vengeance among high-ranking members of the Young Turkish regime (both within ittihad ve terakî and teşkilat-i mahsusa), to questions of socio-economic opportunism and religious fanaticism in the Kurdish-populated periphery. Not as a singular act of unprecedented “Turkish barbarity”, but instead seen in the wider context of preceding acts of mass expulsion and massacre, it establishes a dialogue between the Armenian Genocide (1915) and previous acts of mass expulsion and massacre committed by Tsarist Russia against a mix of indigenous Muslim populations of the Northern Caucasus (1864–1867), known as the Circassians. While recognizing a distinct difference in terms of scope and systematization, this chapter argues that in both cases, an increasingly degenerating political environment triggered a fatal process of dehumanization and immoral rationalization in which populations are divided up, based on their linguistic and religious markers, into loyal and disloyal collectives.

“Eternal Histories, Elusive Homelands” (Chapter 2) explores the intertwined historical pathways of the Armenian, Turkish and Kurdish national movements, and highlights aspects of cooperation and conflict. It seeks to reconstruct the historical evolution of the three movements from the shared goal of imperial reform to the competing quest for a national homeland. The quest for “Western Armenia” takes the reader from early constitutional writings of Perso-Armenian merchants in distant India and loosely organized Armenian solidarity organizations to internationally-operating revolutionary parties such as the Social-Democrat Hnchakian party (1887) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (1890). The quest for “Eastern Turkey” unfolds as a history from Ottoman reformism to pan-Turkist and, later, territorially confined nationalism – the latter reflected in the Union for the Defence of Law in Anatolia and Rumelia (1919). Finally, the quest for “Northern Kurdistan” is a story of early clergy-led uprisings against central authority and short-lived Kurdish independence under Xoybûn (1927–1930); secularization and politicization of the movement under the impact of affirmative policies for Kurdish culture in Soviet Armenia (Radio Yerevan, Rja Țața) and fully-fledged guerilla warfare with the emergence of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Linking the three historical trajectories together, this chapter argues that the removal of Armenian populations during World War I created a highly ambivalent situation on the ground: while it brutally eradicated the demographic basis for an Armenian homeland in the Eastern Provinces, the unintended consequence was a concentration of the remaining
Kurdish population, and resulting demands for the liberation of the region now as a “Kurdish homeland.”

“Mirrored Narratives” (Chapter 3) delves deep into antagonistic politics of memory and the crafting of Armenian, Turkish and Kurdish “national history” as mutually exclusive interpretations of the past. The chapter proposes four distinct analytical dimensions for the study of politics of memory: narrating, silencing, mapping/renaming and performing. The act of narrating (1) is elucidated through a comparative analysis of historical textbooks and other sources that provide a canonized form of the national narrative. This section reveals how all three narratives stand in reciprocal relationship to each other as they narrate their histories as opposing mirror images of one another. In line with their particular socio-historical contexts, specific myths are identified that permeate and reinforce their narratives: the antemurale christianitatis, or border-guard, myth (Armenian), the leitkultur myth (Turkish) and, finally, the force majeure myth (Kurdish). Based on this, narrating is complemented by strategic silencing (2) of “shameful” aspects of one’s own past, which, in return, might appear at the core of past narrations by “the other”. After having discussed the production of “national history” through strategic narrating and silencing, the chapter turns in its second half to the domain of performing (3), i.e. the act of actually inscribing one’s narrative into the body of citizens through performing public rituals of commemoration. In the last section of this chapter, mapping (4) is introduced as an ultimate stage of formalization, when the narrative propagated by national history is fixed and inscribed into the landscape. This chapter argues that, as “national histories” are far from being self-evident and uncontested, states and state-like organizations are compelled to employ vast resources to reproduce and inscribe their respective narratives into both the collective memory of their populations and the geographical landscape.

“Mnemonic Frontiers, Alien Homelands” (Chapter 4) introduces the reader to the main site of this research: the greater Van region – a trilaterally contested geography located at the nexus where competing Turkish, Armenian and Kurdish national narratives collide. Against the homogenizing and mutually exclusive nature of the national narrative, this chapter turns to the local space in search for counter-narratives that allow us to bridge memory across the fault line that continues to divide those whose descendants were expelled to present-day Armenia a century ago, and those who live around the greater Van region in present-day Turkey. In order to retrace expelled and residing populations, the first part of this chapter provides a thorough reconstruction of the demographic structure of the region before and after 1915, as well as a meticulous localization of the descendants of the expelled populations (Armenian and Yezidi Kurds) in present-day Armenia. In order to provide a framework for the in-depth reconstruction of local counter-narratives in the subsequent chapter, the second part of this chapter
engages in a profound discussion on memory and space. Two ways of conceptualizing the local space are proposed: “mnemonic frontier” and “alien homeland”. While the first suggests the existence of spatial factors that favor the emergence of counter-narratives (story-telling, moveable and immovable artifacts, rituals, linguistic landscapes), the latter proposes an understanding of the local space as both homeland and foreign land of the “disappeared other”.

“Entwined Narratives” (Chapter 5) introduces the reader to a novel approach in memory studies – multi-collective memory – arguing in favor of emancipating the notion of “collective memory” from being subjected to the “national collective”. In contrast to public memory propagated by the nation-state, individual accounts on the past are not primarily shaped by the experience of being “Armenian”, “Turkish” or “Kurdish” (national collective). Instead, they are informed by a mix of other non-national collective affiliations that form competing prisms through which individuals envisage the past: being local or newcomer (locality), old or young (temporality), descendants of land owners or field workers (genealogy and class), objectors or conformists (weltanschauung). Exploring the relationship between memory and genealogy (1), it first discusses the collective of the family/kin, in order to reveal conflicting myths of the “old homeland” among the residing and the expelled. Moving on to the relationship between memory and locality (2), it shows how the collective of the fellow-dwellers produces sui generis narrative elements based on the divide between urban and rural (the residing) as well as settled and migrant populations (the expelled), respectively. With regard to the relationship between memory and temporality (3) it discusses the collective of the generation and the evolution of memory along the temporal axis, revealing changing collective perceptions of self and other.

Finally, envisaging the complex relationship between memory and ideology (4) the section concludes with the collective of the fellow-minded. It explores how starkly different weltanschauungen (worldviews), ranging from Sufi humanism to Mesopotamian regionalism and Socialist internationalism, inform and alternate narrations on the past, linking the narrator to a multitude of collectives different from the nation-state. Questioning the exclusively national rooting of collective memory, re-envisioning the past is explored as a multi-collective phenomenon that might be, at least partially, capable of bridging memory of the greater Van region across the divide of the currently residing and the expelled.

Notes
4 Tentatively corresponding with the Ottoman provinces Van and Bitlis.
17 Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türklerin Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1979), 7.
19 Ibid., 15.
20 Ibid., 35 and 41.
Introduction


